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Chalos & Co, P.C. – International Law Firm is proud to announce that George M. Chalos, founder of the firm, has been recognized by Who’s Who Legal: Transport 2016 as a standout practitioner in the field.

Who’s Who Legal: Transport 2016 is the culmination of months of research and analysis in which the opinions of clients and transport lawyers from around the world are analyzed to compile a compendium of practitioners in seventy-six (76) jurisdictions who are considered leaders in their area of expertise.  All nominees in Who’s Who are selected based upon a comprehensive, independent survey with both general counsel and transport lawyers in private practice worldwide, and only specialists who have met independent international research criteria are recognized.

Mr. Chalos’ specializes in maritime and transport matters, with a particular expertise in Marpol and other pollution related matters, including the defense of criminal allegations and complex third-party litigation which customarily arises in any significant pollution incident. Mr. Chalos has been a published author with respect to the presentation of claims to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and the United States’ vessel initiative.  Mr. Chalos is a Proctor in Admiralty, which is the highest distinction and honor bestowed upon U.S. maritime lawyers by the Maritime Law Association and serves as a Member of the Board of the Federal Bar Association (“FBA”) Admiralty Section and the FBA Chapter for the Southern District of New York

For more information about Who’s Who Legal or to receive a full version of the 2016 publication focused on experts in the transportation industry, please visit http://whoswholegal.com/shop/product/889/transport-2015/

On November 30, 2015, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana handed down the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the penalty phase of the civil case against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (“Anadarko”) for its role in the 2010 DEEPWATER HORIZON incident.  Limiting its decision to the Government’s claim based on the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the Court found Anadarko liable and imposed civil penalties of USD 159.5 million.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON incident remains the worst oil spill in U.S. history.  On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the offshore drilling rig caused a blowout of the underwater oil well Macando, approximately fifty (50) miles off the coast of Louisiana.  Eleven (11) of the one hundred twenty-six (126) people aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON died in the explosion and subsequent fires; seventeen (17) more were seriously injured.  Fueled by hydrocarbons from the well, the DEEPWATER HORIZON burned continuously until it capsized and sank two (2) days later.  However, as the rig descended, piping that connected the rig to the seafloor collapsed and fractured, which resulted in the discharge of nearly 3.19 million barrels of oil into the Gulf over a four-month timespan.

It was not long after the blowout that lawsuits began to be filed, with over 3,000 cases and well over 100,000 plaintiffs filing claims.  Most of the federal cases that resulted from the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident were consolidated as Multidistrict Litigation 2179.  Part of that consolidated litigation included the case captioned United States v. BP Production, et al, which included BP Exploration and Production, Inc, MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC, various Transocean entities, and Anadarko.  As part of the Government’s complaint against these organizations, civil penalties where sought under the CWA and a declaratory judgment under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

The CWA itself prohibits the discharge of “harmful” quantities of oil into or upon statutorily covered waters or adjoining shorelines – in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 or Deepwater Port Act of 1974 – or which may affect natural resources.  Certain persons (i.e., owners, operators, persons in charge of vessels, onshore facilities, and offshore facilities) who violate the CWA’s prohibition of oil discharged into U.S. waters are subject to civil penalties up to a statutory maximum of $1,100 per barrel of oil spilled.

The CWA provides eight (8) factors a court must consider in determining the actual amount of a civil penalty: (1) the seriousness of the violation(s); (2) the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation; (3) the degree of culpability involved; (4) any other culpability form the same incident; (5) any history of prior violations; (6) the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge; (7) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator; and (8) any other matters justice may require.

In addressing the above factors in Anadarko’s role as a 25% stakeholder in the DEEPWATER HORIZON, the Court found as follows:  First, the Court found the seriousness of the discharge to be unprecedented in scale and damage.  Second, in extrapolating the “economic benefit” of the spill to Anadarko, the Court found that, although the entire DEEPWATER HORIZON enterprise saved USD 13.5 million in preventative expenses that may have forestalled the disaster (with Anadarko’s share being USD 3.375 million), this figure was ultimately offset by the USD 4 billion Anadarko eventually paid to settle compensatory claims arising from the spill.  Third, the Court held that as a non-operating minority owner in the DEEPWATER HORIZON – in contrast to BP, who was the operator and 65% owner – Anadarko was not directly culpable for the spill.  Fourth, the Court found that, to date, Anadarko had not paid penalties for the spill, unlike the other parties which had paid billions to various charitable organizations pursuant to a plea agreement.  Fifth, the Court found that Anadarko had at least ten (10) prior CWA violations in the six (6) years preceding the spill.  Sixth, the Court found Anadarko’s effort to mitigate the damages were “at best, adequate,” as it “did not shirk its responsibilities, but it could hardly be called a willing participant in the response.”  Seventh, Anadarko itself admitted that the statutory maximum, in this case USD $3.5 billion, would not be ruinous to it, although it did contend that any penalty would have a negative economic impact on its business. Finally, in deciding the eighth factor, the Court looked to the CWA’s purpose as a deterrent and weighed the amount of penalty in light of its possible effect on the investment of other non-operators in similar ventures.

Ultimately, the Court struck a balance, citing Anadarko’s lack of direct culpability over the remedial and regulatory purposes of the CWA.  In the end, the Court determined that Anadarko should be assessed a penalty of USD 50 per barrel – well below the maximum of USD 1,100 per barrel – for a total of USD 159.5 million.

To read a copy of the Court’s decision, click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

Michelle Otero Valdés, with the assistance before trial of Melissa Russo, successfully defended Mobro Marine, Inc. (“Mobro”) in a bench trial before the Honorable James Cohn in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Judge Cohn issued his decision on October 6, 2015, finding that third-party defendant, Mobro, had no fault for the loss of twenty-one (21) containers which fell from the barge, Atlantic Trader,off the coast of Key Biscayne, Florida.

The Plaintiff, Transatlantic Lines, LLC (“Transatlantic”) had chartered and operated the Atlantic Trader, a barge which was found to have experienced substantial corrosion and which lacked a full complement of container sockets and D-rings, to replace another vessel for its regular cargo transport from Jacksonville, Florida to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Three (3) days prior to the Atlantic Trader’s incidental voyage, Transatlantic hired Mobro to install a crane and weld approximately thirty (30) D-rings to the Atlantic Trader’s deck. Transatlantic purchased the D-rings and placed them on the deck wherever old D-rings were missing. Employees of Transatlantic and Defendant Portus Stevedoring, LLC (“Portus”), discussed how to approach the problem of the Atlantic Trader’s missing container sockets. Portus suggested that 4×4 wood dunnage would be used to level the deck and accommodate the shipping containers. Transatlantic agreed. During the voyage, the wooden dunnage compressed under the weight of the shipping containers and created slack in the lashing. The slack, in turn, subjected the lines to extraordinary force while the Atlantic Trader was underway. As a result, twenty-one (21) shipping containers fell into the waters off of the coast of Florida, causing Transatlantic a loss of $517,942.03.

Transatlantic sued Portus under three (3) theories of liability: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance; and (3) negligence. Portus in turn brought Mobro into the suit by alleging that it was the Mobro’s negligence in welding a handful of D-rings that contributed to the loss. The Court concluded that although Transatlantic established Portus’s liability, Transatlantic itself was also partially liable for the loss in failing to exercise reasonable care when it approved Portus’s suggestion to use the wooden dunnage to secure the cargo, in providing Portus with a barge in a broken-down condition, in failing to provide Portus with the barge’s Trim and Stability Booklet, and in failing to monitor the barge’s cargo compression of the dunnage and to tighten the lashing at they required. As a result, the Court found that Transatlantic was sixty (60) percent at fault for the loss and Portus was forty (40) percent at fault for the loss.

Moreover, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c), which treats impleaded third-parties as though they had been sued directly by the plaintiff, the Court stated that Transatlantic and Portus bear the burden of proving that Mobro acted in a negligent manner. As neither party was able to prove that Mobro was negligent, the Court entered judgment in favor of Mobro and assigned it no liability.

To read a copy of the Court’s decision click here.

For more information about this matter, or how Chalos & Co, P.C. may be of assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us atinfo@chaloslaw.com.

In Nguyen v. American Commercial Lines, L.L.C., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denying American Commercial Lines’ (ACL) motion for summary judgment relating to claims made under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) by various fishermen and other parties.

A barge owned by ACL was designated by the United States Coast Guard as having been the source of an oil discharge after a collision with another vessel.  ACL was named the responsible party for any claims filed under OPA for damages arising from the spill. The Fifth Circuit was presented with two (2) issues to consider in this case: (1) whether the fishermen presented enough information to ACL to comply with OPA’s claim submission requirement, and (2) whether or not the fishermen had to comply with both the requirement to give the responsible party at least ninety (90) days to respond to a claim before filing a lawsuit and the bar from filing a lawsuit more than three (3) years after the oil discharge occurred.

On the issue of whether sufficient information was attached to the claim, the Fifth Circuit found for the fisherman, holding that they had submitted enough information with their claim letters to ACL to begin the ninety (90) day settlement clock. Most of the fishermen submitted applicable fishing licenses, selected dock receipts for seafood sold to wholesalers, and included federal tax returns.  ACL responded with a laundry list of additional documents it required to process their claims, which the fishermen declined to send.  ACL claimed it had the right to demand these documents because the separate OPA requirements for filing a claim for damages to a federally established fund could ask for such information, however, the Fifth Circuit said that these did not apply to claims against the responsible party. OPA’s only requirement is that the fishermen file a claim to the responsible party, and thus the claim and information provided was sufficient for ACL to decide whether or not to settle the case.

The Fifth Circuit then moved to the issue of the two (2) time restrictions imposed by the OPA. On this issue, the Court found for ACL, stating that a second group of fishermen who filed their claims within ninety (90) days of the end of the three (3) year period were barred from filing a lawsuit a few days after sending their claims to ACL. The Court said that the two (2) requirements work independently of one another, meaning that the fishermen were not able to use following one requirement to excuse not following the other. The fishermen tried to argue that the “spirit” of the law would be violated if they were not allowed to file their lawsuit for damages and since ACL had not responded to the previous fishermen, they assumed they would not respond to their claims either.  However, the Court said that they could not enforce the spirit of the law outside of the explicit rules in the law itself and an assumption that the claim would be denied by ACL was not enough to say that they had complied with the ninety (90) day requirement in OPA.  Accordingly, if a claimant does not submit a claim at least ninety (90) days before the expiration of the three (3) year statute of limitation period, then the claim is barred.

To read a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

Four environmental agencies petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the Vessel General Permit (“VGP”) issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in 2013 under Section 509(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which regulates the discharge of ballast water from ships (and is the primary cause of the spread of invasive species to different bodies of water).  On October 5, 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Natural Resources Defense Counsel, et al. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, holding that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the permit and remanded back to the EPA for further proceedings.

The sixty-five (65) page decision goes into great detail regarding the historic context for why such a VGP is necessary, the purposes of the CWA, and the technical components of the statute for preventing pollutants and measuring compliance with the act, specifically water quality standards.  The EPA issued the 2013 VGP allowing vessels to discharge ballast water subject to certain limitations on the living organisms in the discharge.  The Court found that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to certain standards imposed in the VGP as follows:

1.    The decision to set the Technology Based Effluent Limits based on the IMO standard, instead of following the CWA’s mandate to set the standards based on the Best Available Technology economically achievable and failing to explain why it adhered to the IMO standard when technologies exist which exceed those minimum requirements;

2.    The EPA’s failure to consider onshore treatment facilities for ballast water discharge simply because none were in existence; even though such systems could be technologically available.  The Court noted that the EPA’s own Scientific Advisory Board Report noted that onshore treatment would have a number of advantages over shipboard treatment given the limited space on ships, overburdened crews, vibrations, weight allowances, limited power, ship instability, and greater corrosion rates;

3.    The decision to exempt pre-2009 Lakers Vessels from Technology Based Effluent Limits, without providing sufficient explanation for such exclusion;

4.    The decision to permit narrative standards for Water Quality Based Effluent Limits because it is insufficient to give a shipowner guidance as to what is expected.  The Court held that just because writing such standards would be difficult, the permit writers cannot just “throw up their hands” and refuse to issue more specific guidelines;

5.    Finally, that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to establish monitoring and reporting requirements for Water Quality Based Effluent Limits, as the requirements were only for providing information on expected date, location, volume and salinity, none of which provides sufficient information on the ballast water “quality.”

The Court has remanded back to the EPA for further handling, studies, and revised VGP consistent with the Court’s ruling. The Court has allowed the VGP to remain in place pending issuance of a new VGP consistent with its holdings.

To read a copy of the Second Circuit’s Opinion, click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

In U.S. v. Citgo Petroleum Corporation, The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed convictions out of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, holding that the District Court erroneously instructed the jury about the scope of a regulation concerning “oil-water separators” and misinterpreted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) of 1918.

In March of 2002, CITGO’s Corpus Christi refinery was subject to a ‘surprise’ inspection which revealed 130,000 barrels of oil floating atop two uncovered equalization tanks. These two equalization tanks were downstream from two “Corrugated Plate Interceptor oil-water separators” at CITGO’s refinery.  Since the tanks contained such a high content of oil, Texas authorities concluded that CITGO was improperly using the equalization tanks as oil-water separators.  Additionally, because the tanks were uncovered, the Texas authorities alleged CITGO was in direct violation of Subpart QQQ which regulates the standards of performance for “Volatile Organic Compounds” emissions from petroleum refinery wastewater systems under 40 CFR Part 60.  The government went one step further also indicted CITGO on ‘taking’ migratory birds in violation of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703 on a suspected theory that birds had died in these uncovered equalization tanks.  Environmental inspectors cited CITGO for violating the Clean Air Act (CAA) and CITGO was indicted on ten (10) different counts in total.

The trial occurred in two parts.  During the first trial, a jury exonerated the defendants on three CAA counts, but found CITGO guilty of two counts of knowingly operating the equalization tanks as oil-water separators without emissions control devices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) and 40 C.F.R. § 60.692.4. The jury instructions quoted Subpart QQQ’s definition of an oil-water separator, and also added: “[t]he definition of oil-water separator does not require that [it] have any or all of the ancillary equipment mentioned such as forebays, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers….An oil-water separator is defined by how it is used.”  Clean Air Act Opinion, 2011 WL 1155684 at 3.  Post-trial, and on appeal CITGO challenged the jury instruction on the basis that Subpart QQQ defines an oil-water separator by how it is used and by its constituent parts, and therefore the jury instruction was improper.  CITGO contended that the equalization tanks were not required to be covered, since Subpart QQQ only applies to oil-water separators and not equalization tanks.  In the non-jury trial phase, the District Court found CITGO guilty on three (out of five) counts for the ‘taking’ of migratory birds in violation of MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703.  CITGO also appealed this conviction, contending that the Court erred in interpreting the MBTA statute.  Specifically, that illegally “taking” migratory birds only applies to conduct intentionally directed at birds such as hunting and trapping, and not to unintentional and indirect acts.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial convictions, holding that Subpart QQQ “only regulates equipment conventionally, not merely functionally, known as oil-water separators, along with specifically described ancillary equipment.”  The Fifth Circuit stated that the equalization tanks at CITGO’s Corpus Christi refinery had skimmers, but did not have weirs, grit chambers, or sludge hoppers, therefore the tanks were not oil-water separators, and as such Subpart QQQ did not apply.  Additionally, the Appellate Court held that Congress’ intent for the MBTA’s ban on “takings” only prohibits intentional acts (and omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.  The Court noted that millions of birds are killed each year by communication towers, cars, and even domestic cats.  If the government’s preferred strict interpretation of the MBTA, i.e. that it prohibits all acts or omissions that “directly” kill birds and where bird deaths are foreseeable, then the scope of the government power to prosecute for every activity that proximately caused bird deaths would be virtually limitless and lead to absurd results.

To read a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

Harris County, Texas – George M. Chalos and Briton P. Sparkman successfully defended a hotel owner and operator in a recent jury trial matter before the Hon. Larry Weiman of the 80^thDistrict Court in Harris County, Texas.  In the case, the plaintiff (a 55 year-old woman) alleged that the defendant hotel failed to maintain a safe premises, which caused the her to slip and fall and sustain serious injuries including but not limited to permanent partial disabilities and disfigurement.  While the plaintiff was attempting to enter the shower, she allegedly slipped and fell, sustaining comminuted fractures to the distal third of the right tibia and fibula requiring four (4) surgeries.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide the required safety elements in the bathroom as required by Texas law.  The injured plaintiff’s husband also claimed for loss of consortium.  Defendants denied all allegations of negligence.  Plaintiffs sought approximately $925,000 in damages.  Following a four day trial, the jury returned a complete take nothing verdict in favor of the defense in under twenty-five (25) minutes.

The case can be found at Vicky and Daniel Wright vs. D&B Patel LP, et al., Case No. 2013-44365; 2015 TX Jury Verdicts Review Lexis 112, Vol. 6, Issue 10.

For more information about this matter, or how Chalos & Co, P.C. may be of assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

In Lord & Taylor LLC v. Zim Integrated Shipping Servs., Ltd., the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Zim Integrated Shipping Services, Ltd. (“Zim”) as carrier, in a COGSA recovery for damaged goods suit. The damages occurred when Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012 and flooded a container terminal (Zim’s subcontractor) on Staten Island. The plaintiff, Lord & Taylor, had several containers full of their women’s clothing at the terminal and the flooding that resulted ruined most of the contents. Lord & Taylor brought suit to recover under COGSA for the lost goods.  Zim defended based on the Act of God exception in COGSA.  The Court agreed with Zim that the Act of God defense was applicable. For an Act of God defense, the carrier must prove that the damage was caused by an unexpected natural event and that the damage could not have been prevented with the exercise of reasonable care. The Court noted that while not all hurricanes are legally Acts of God, because they can be common in the waters at a given time of year, ones that cause “unexpected and unforeseeable devastation” are classic Acts of God. The key, then, is determining the foreseeability of the hurricane and the reasonableness of the actions the defendant took in response to that information.

The Court found that pre-storm predictions lacked sufficient reliability to have required additional actions by Zim and the terminal to save the cargo. There were wildly varying reports of where and when Sandy would make landfall, how strong it would be, and what sort of storm surge could be expected. Lord & Taylor argued that there were a number of actions the terminal should have taken to protect the cargo, asserting that the damage was foreseeable because some of the reports were using terms like “historic.” The Court disagreed, saying such descriptions were far too vague and did not provide the sort of specific information actually needed to protect the cargo from the damage sustained. Ultimately, there simply was insufficient time between when the weather services could provide high-confidence predictions and when Sandy hit  the terminal to actually move the cargo to safety.  Zim successfully demonstrated that Sandy ended up being much worse than even worst-case-scenario predictions.  Based on the weather predictions, most of the pre-storm preparations by the terminal had focused on securing the cargo from wind damage  The storm surge, which ended up causing most of the damage, was not predicted to pass the bulkhead at the terminal. As such, it was not considered a danger requiring the type of measures and precautions that Lord & Taylor asserted after the fact. Based on the unprecedented severity of Hurricane Sandy and the reasonableness of the precautions the terminal did take based on the best information available, the District Court found Zim and the terminal were entitled to the Act of God defense, not negligent and not liable for the cargo damage.

To read a copy of the District Court’s decision, click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

In Guam Industrial Services, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company, The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court for the District of Guam’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”)  and its denial of coverage for Guam Industrial Services’ (“Guam Shipyard”) insurance claims for the sinking of its dry dock.  Guam Shipyard filed claims on two insurance policies when its dry dock sank while being repaired so that it could be recertified. Guam Shipyard was seeking certification to fulfill a warranty in their hull and machinery insurance policy. Sinking with the dry dock were a number of sealed barrels and other containers of oil which the Coast Guard demanded be removed before recovery and salvage could begin, despite the fact that the containers never opened and no pollutants escaped. Zurich denied both claims; the first because Guam Shipyard did not have a certificate of any sort at the time of the sinking, and the second because there was no pollution as defined in the policy because none of the pollutants went in to the water.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the insurer Zurich was within their rights to deny the claims. Regarding the first claim, Guam Shipyard argued that, because Zurich had accepted commercial, rather than naval, certification in the past, they had waived their right to ask for naval certification. The Court, however, held that, while Zurich may or may not have waived their right to require Navy certification, they did not waive their right to ask for any sort of certificate.

As to the second claim, the Ninth Circuit also accepted Zurich’s argument that since the language of the policy was that it would cover costs of any damage caused by accidental “discharge, dispersal, release, or escape” of pollutants, Zurich was within their rights to deny coverage. The Court reasoned that, since it was only the containers that touched the environment, it could not be said that the oil had been discharged, dispersed, released, or escaped under those words’ “common meanings.” Because the words all had plain meanings and a dispute about applying them would create an ambiguity, the Court held that there was no imperative to construe the meaning of the terms in favor of the insured.

In a scathing dissent on the pollution coverage claim, Judge Kozinski excoriated Zurich for its “slimy conduct” in denying the claim from Guam Shipyard. He deemed it “absurd” to think that a rational dry dock owner would want an insurance policy that would pay based on the whether or not the container lets pollutants out right away or not. Whether it does or not, the company has to pay cleanup costs mandated by the Coast Guard, which was precisely what Guam Shipyard was seeking to have covered by their maritime pollution policy. He explained that “[i]f you slap a silk suit on a monkey, you still won’t want to take it to the prom. And if you pour crude oil into a barrel, you still won’t want it in your hot tub,” advocating for the need to look at the reality of the situation and giving contracts the intent of the parties.

To read a copy of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, click here.

For more information about the Court’s decision and how it may apply to specific facts and circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact us at info@chaloslaw.com.

The WISTA USA 2015 AGM and Conference was held Friday, May 15, 2015 and hosted by the New York/New Jersey Chapter of WISTA USA. The topics discussed included Emerging Challenges Facing Shipping.  For those not familiar with WISTA, the Women’s International Shipping and Trading Association,  is a networking organization for women at the management level in the maritime industry.

WISTA mission statement holds that WISTA shall:

• Facilitate the exchange of contacts, information and experiences among its members;
• Promote and facilitate the education of its members; and
• Provide liaison with other related institutions and organizations worldwide.

WISTA’s vision is that shall be acknowledged as a professional and highly reputable shipping organization with focus on improving levels of competency in the shipping industry and shall:

• Attract highly qualified people to the industry;
• Attract highly qualified people to the organization; and
• Improve level of competency through focus on education and knowledge.

A WISTA USA AGM, begins with leadership meetings the day before the official conference. On the day of the AGM, there is a business meeting for WISTA members only, which lasted approximately three (3) hours. The business of WISTA USA is discussed, items are voted on and chapters provide their chapter reports.  Michelle Otero Valdes, the head of the Chalos & Co, P.C. Miami office delivered the WISTA Florida chapter report, along with Lesley Karentz, co-president for WISTA Florida.

The morning AGM was followed by a lunch and afternoon conference presentations.  The Conference concluded with an AGM dinner at the India House. The India House came into being as an organization in 1914 when a group of businessmen headed by James A. Farrell, then president of United States Steel Company, in collaboration with Willard Straight, decided to create a meeting place for the interests of foreign trade.  Presidents of the Lackawanna Steel Company, Dollar Steamship Company, W.R. Grace Shipping, Chase National Bank, and United States Rubber all became Governors of India House and remained active during its first two decades. The dinner was held in the properly named “Marine Room”.

For more information on WISTA please visit their website here.  If you have questions regarding the conference, please contact Michelle Otero Valdes at mov@chaloslaw.com.